The problem the new commander inherits
The defence ministry announced that Christian Freuding will take Germany’s highest military post in February. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has chosen a commander who coordinated assistance to Ukraine, followed the war’s technological changes and then led the army. The weight of this appointment lies in the problem he inherits. The establishment of a drone regiment alongside technical problems in the digital command programme makes the relationship between new equipment and the systems directing it central to the assessment.[1]
Freuding’s priorities establish that connection: electronic warfare, unmanned systems, defence against low-flying threats, indirect and deep fires, and digital command. The last is meant to connect the others. The task therefore extends beyond five separate procurement lists. Units need to share information and use different equipment within the same mission structure. A system functioning in isolation and a capability usable as part of a force are different achievements. That connection is where I would assess the appointment’s military result.[1]
Integration determines usable capability
The reported technical blockage in a digitalisation programme worth billions of euros is a concrete obstacle. It does not establish that German formations cannot operate; the reporting supplies no such readiness measurement. But integration cannot be treated as complete while connection problems remain unresolved. Technological renewal requires communications and command arrangements alongside the equipment purchased. My measure is how successfully units can work together with a new system after it enters the inventory.[1]
Freuding’s experience with Ukraine could help identify and prioritise that bottleneck. The strongest alternative is straightforward: identifying a problem and completing procurement, technical integration and training are separate tasks. A commander’s knowledge cannot remove every constraint on those processes. His defence visit with a delegation of generals demonstrates an effort to examine different practices. Its value depends on transferring those lessons into how units operate. The visit alone does not establish a deterrent effect.[1]
Supporting a larger force
Personnel targets bring a second burden. Plans envisage moving from roughly 186000 troops to 260000 active personnel, alongside 200000 reservists. Those targets cannot be counted as people already added to formations. Expansion requires provision for training, maintenance and command. The arrangements for keeping reservists available belong in the same calculation. Read separately from that support structure, a headcount is an inadequate description of the force available for use.[1]
I would assess Freuding through three concrete tasks: restoring progress in the stalled digital programme, integrating new technologies into joint unit activity, and supporting personnel growth with training. None requires assuming that every purchase or appointment produces an immediate battlefield result. These tasks define the distance between a political decision and usable force. The incoming commander must make different modernisation programmes work within the same military structure. Sustainable readiness depends on that structure continuing to function.[1]