The bottleneck in weapons flows

Germany’s BND gains sabotage powers that extend to covert operations against weapons supply chains. The legislation approved by parliament covers disabling hackers’ servers, disrupting disinformation networks and interrupting weapons flows. Berlin is adding intervention against the means used by a threat to its existing intelligence work. The operational change lies in that sequence: intelligence collection can lead to a decision to intervene, followed by effects that the service has to manage.[1]

Access to a server and lasting disruption of a weapons shipment require different preparations. For the BND, an operation’s value depends on identifying the target’s role in the threat and choosing the point of intervention. A supply interruption could be short-lived if another route or supplier takes over. That is my inference about the operational limits of the powers described in the legislation. The alternative is that the targeted connection is difficult to replace, allowing a small intervention to create a long delay. The same authority could produce very different effects depending on the target’s structure.[1]

Sustaining an intervention

The domestic service, the BfV, makes the implementation problem concrete. Its new tools include blocking or diverting data flows, altering data held for malicious purposes and disabling explosives when specific threats are identified. Each intervention touches a different part of a threat: communications, information or physical equipment. The risk of effects spreading beyond the target varies accordingly. Target selection therefore needs operational control during the intervention, including the ability to monitor effects and stop an action. Those requirements are my assessment of the capabilities needed to use the tools described in the reform.[1]

Berlin’s wider powers could strengthen deterrence by increasing an opponent’s expectation that its operations can be disrupted. A plausible alternative is adaptation: an opponent could divide its activities across more connections to absorb interventions. I therefore look beyond the number of powers granted. The useful measures are which threat was interrupted, by which tool, and for how long the disruption could be sustained. Dobrindt invokes foreign threats, while opponents challenge the erosion of the boundary between policing and intelligence. Operational competence and oversight meet in the way the services use their new instruments.[1]