Whose initiative was cancelled
Iraq's National Security Council, chaired by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, called Wednesday's strikes on Popular Mobilisation Forces bases "a flagrant violation of Iraq's sovereignty" and said they contravened the principles of international law and the UN Charter. Al-Zaidi cancelled in protest the first official visit to Saudi Arabia he had been due to make in Riyadh on Thursday.[1]
Among the responses available to Iraq, this is the one that costs Iraq most. The visit was no favour Riyadh granted Iraq; it was a step Iraq was taking towards Riyadh. Cancelling it produces a loss in Iraq's own programme rather than in the other party's, and a state giving up its own initiative carries a more concrete cost than a declared condemnation. A more inward-facing explanation may also hold: the cancellation may be aimed at meeting the expectations of the armed group that was struck and of its political representation.[1]
One text, two audiences
The Popular Mobilisation Forces said at least 20 of its members were killed and 32 wounded across seven provinces from Kirkuk to Basra; Iraqi and Iranian media reported at least four Revolutionary Guard advisers killed. Saudi Arabia's defence ministry said the strikes answered drone attacks on petroleum facilities launched from Iraqi territory and that it does not seek escalation. The two accounts attach the same event to two different chains of responsibility.[1]
Iraq's statement has to speak to two audiences at once: the political circle of the armed force that was struck, and the neighbour with which it wants investment and energy ties. The language of sovereignty can carry both in one sentence, because it establishes a legal violation while naming no enemy to be answered. The Saudi ministry's statement that it does not seek escalation serves the same function from the other direction; both sides keep the event inside a frame that can be closed.[1]
What the visit's new date will say
Whether the condemnation was a bounded signal or a change of direction will be shown by what happens to the visit. If within three months it takes place on a new date and Iraq makes no public demand for compensation or change in the status of the bases, the language of sovereignty will have been used as a frame that can be closed. If the visit does not happen in that time, the cost of the opening towards Riyadh will have proved higher than Iraq reckoned.[1]