Two portraits beside one another
The man standing in London’s Arnolfini Portrait also appears in another Van Eyck painting coming from Berlin. The London exhibition keeps the Arnolfini connection in that second picture’s title; the Gemäldegalerie calls it Portrait of a Man with a Red Chaperon. Those names offer a viewer different relationships: membership of a merchant family, or a man whose identity remains open. The painted surface stays in place while its identification moves.[1]
Stephan Kemperdick’s contribution to the new exhibition catalogue widens that distance. The Berlin curator proposes reading the 1434 couple as Van Eyck and his wife Margaret. His argument draws on the large inscription beside the man’s head and the Saint Margaret figure near the woman. Accepting that proposal would replace the familiar encounter with a merchant family with an image of the painter’s own marriage. That is the implication of Kemperdick’s proposal, while the identification remains unsettled.[1]
What a name carries
Placing the paintings together makes objections as tangible as resemblance. Nicholas Flory and Emma Capron compare the greyish-blue eyes in Margaret’s documented 1439 portrait with the brown eyes of the woman in the double portrait. They regard the proposal as speculative. Other scholars defend the old inventory’s connection to the Arnolfini family. A useful comparison for the viewer begins here: a resemblance between faces shares the question with a detail in another painting and a historical identification.[1]
What I value in this arrangement is that two versions of the same man meet without the institutions having to agree on a name. Berlin’s broader title gives the viewer room to read the face at some distance from a predetermined family story. That may reflect a museum’s preference to retain uncertainty in a title rather than a new decision about identity. London’s retention of Arnolfini keeps the established connection visible. The gap between the names offers a concrete comparison before the paintings: the face stays the same, while the proposition connecting it to another person changes.[1]