IAEA identifies a second uranium enrichment hall at Yongbyon
The IAEA said North Korea’s new building at Yongbyon could house up to 28 centrifuge cascades and that an expanded annex at Kangson showed signs of operation. Inspectors have been barred from the country since 2009. The agency based its assessment on satellite imagery and open sources, including state-media photographs of Kim Jong-un’s June visit.
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The new building could hold 28 centrifuge cascades
The International Atomic Energy Agency says it has identified a second uranium-enrichment building at North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex. According to the agency assessment reported by The Guardian and Reuters, the structure is large enough to house up to 28 centrifuge cascades. Cascades are linked groups of machines that enrich uranium in stages. The agency described the building's potential capacity but could not verify the number of centrifuges in each cascade, their performance or the actual operating rate. The published findings therefore do not establish an output volume or a number of weapons the plant could supply.[1], [2]
Kangson also shows signs of expansion
The agency's report is not limited to the new structure at Yongbyon. Reuters and The Guardian also report signs that an expanded annex at the Kangson enrichment complex near Pyongyang has begun operating. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said continued activity and reported expansion at the two locations were a matter of serious concern. The report assesses that North Korea's enrichment infrastructure is growing at multiple sites. That is a finding about observed physical expansion; it does not provide a newly verified figure for the amount of highly enriched uranium generated.[2], [1]
The assessment relies on evidence gathered remotely
IAEA inspectors were expelled from North Korea in 2009 and have had no direct access to the facilities since then. The Guardian reports that the agency identified the new Yongbyon building by comparing satellite imagery from its construction with photographs published by North Korean state media during Kim Jong-un's June visit. Reuters also says the assessment rests on satellite imagery and open-source material. That method provides a shared line of evidence about the building's location, scale and visible equipment, but it cannot replace direct measurement of daily production inside. The report's limits on capacity and operation therefore remain important.[1], [2]
