What was said from the platform
At the Russia-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum in Omsk on 25 July, Tokayev said “perhaps it is time to freeze this conflict and return to the Istanbul formula 2.0”, describing the assurances as “security guarantees from the great powers, including Russia”. In the same remarks he said Putin had shown “utmost diplomatic flexibility” and added that “this must be brought to an end”. On one side of the scale: one of Moscow's closest partners naming a form of ending, publicly, beside the host. On the other: those words belong to a proposal, not to a commitment.[1]
In recalling this framework Tokayev also inherits its history. According to the report, Moscow and Kyiv met in Istanbul after the 2022 invasion and again in 2025, and neither round produced a breakthrough. The “2.0” suffix concedes as much: what is being recalled is a recognised procedure rather than a process that worked. That need not be a flaw. A recognised procedure spares the parties the need to invent a pretext for sitting down again; which subjects come in which order is already known.[1]
Party and guarantor in the same chair
The proposal's real architectural problem sits in its assurance clause. Tokayev ties the guarantees to the great powers and places Russia inside that set. In a freeze agreement, when the actor with the greatest capacity to breach the line is also the actor who would enforce the guarantee against a breach, the guarantee shifts from a legal obligation towards a declaration of preference. In architectures of this kind the missing piece is usually a third element: a monitoring arrangement that measures the line, registers a violation and publishes its findings independently of the parties. No such element is named in the proposal.[1]
The counter-reading deserves weighing too. A freeze could reduce deaths and lower the risk of miscalculation; there are cases where a flawed arrangement beats no arrangement. The same proposal could equally fix the present line on unequal terms and buy time. Nothing available today allows a choice between those readings, since the report carries neither Putin's reply nor the Kremlin's and Ukraine's reactions. What is worth watching is the announcement of a follow-up format with named participants and a method of monitoring, rather than a repetition of the words.[1]